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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
3 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Appellant asserts in his Brief that the trial court 
erred in concluding that Officer Scott had a reasonable suspicion 
the defendant had either committed a crime, was in the act of 
committing a crime, or was attempting to commit a crime at the 
time of the stop of his vehicle. The "determination of whether a 
specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a 
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for 
correctness, . . . with a measure of discretion to the trial 
judge when applying that standard to a given set of facts." 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2.d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By way of Information, Defendant was charged with Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44; Open 
Container of Liquor in or about a vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §44-6-44.20; and Driving a Motor 
Vehicle with a Suspended License, a Class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §53-3-227. Defendant filed a motion 
to suppress which was heard by the trial court on February 3, 
1998, and denied on that same day. Defendant then entered a 
conditional guilty plea to Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol 
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and/or Drugs, a Class B misdemeanor, subject to the right to 
appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. On 
March 16, 1998, counsel for both Defendant and the prosecution 
executed a stipulated plea of Defendant, which was entered on 
March 20 1998. On March 17, 1998, Defendant was sentenced. 
Defendant filed a Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence on March 
20, 1998. Thereafter, on March 31, 1998, the trial court signed 
its judgement, which was entered on April 2, 1998. Defendant 
filed Notice of Appeal on April 23, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 21, 1997, at approximately 9:00 p.m., 
Defendant went to Arctic Circle in Clearfield, Utah, to purchase 
some food. (R. at 68, Transcript of Hearing, p. 3, lines 16-25, 
p. 4, lines 1-9). 
2. Ms. Lisa Smith, Assistant Manager of Arctic Circle, 
observed defendant walk into the restaurant. She testified that 
he could hardly walk as he entered the restaurant, and that he 
smelled of alcohol really bad. (Id. at R. 68, p. 4, lines 1-4) 
3. Ms. Smith-also testified that she noticed defendant had 
slurred speech, however, she did not relay this to the 
dispatcher. (Id. at R. 68, p. 8, lines 8-16, p. 9, lines 14-18). 
4. While Defendant was still in the restaurant, Ms. Smith 
called the police and described what she observed. (Id. at R. 
68, p. 4, lines 14-24). She also gave dispatch a description of 
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his vehicle. (Id. at R. 68, p. 5, lines 1-3, 20-25). She 
related to the dispatcher that defendant was leaving the 
restaurant and getting into his truck and driving away. {Id. at 
R. 68, p. 5, lines 20-25). She also testified to seeing a police 
car pull out behind defendant. (Id. at R. 68, p. 6, lines 3-25). 
5. Officer Scott received a call from dispatch to respond 
to Arctic Circle on a complaint that an intoxicated person was at 
the restaurant and it was believed he would drive away. (Id. at 
R. 68, p. 12, lines 7-25, p. 13, lines 1-6). 
6. Officer Scott pulled into the parking lot of a gas 
station across the street from Arctic Circle where he could see 
the Arctic Circle parking lot. He saw the described vehicle in 
the parking lot. It was parked in the stall and appeared to be 
running; it also had its lights on. Officer Scott did not 
observe anyone in the truck at that time. (Id. at R. 68, p. 13, 
lines 10-25, p. 14, lines 1-12). 
7. Officer Scott was still speaking with dispatch who 
related that defendant was still in the store. Officer Scott 
then observed defendant leave the store, get into the driver's 
side of the truck and saw the truck back up and pull out of the 
driveway and onto Main street. (Id. at R. 68, p. 14, lines 13-25, 
p. 15, lines 1-11, p. 16, lines 1-3). 
8. Officer Scott immediately pulled out and followed the 
vehicle which made a right hand turn onto 250 North from Main 
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Street. Arctic Circle is located at 300 North Main. (Id. at R. 
68, p. 16, lines 1-3, 10-13).2 
9. Officer Scott described the manner that defendant made 
the turn as improper. He stated the turn was made from the 
center of the roadway, rather than the right side of the road. 
(Id. at R. 68, p. 16, lines 18-24). After observing the turn, 
Officer Scott stopped the defendant's vehicle. (Id. at R. 68, p. 
17, lines 2-3). When he approached the vehicle, he noticed a 
strong odor of alcohol coming from the truck. (Id. at R. 68, p. 
17, lines 14-18) . 
10. Officer Scott intended to cross the street and talk to 
defendant before he pulled out of the parking lot. (Id. at R. 
68, p. 19, lines 4-7). 
11. Defendant testified that the reason he made the turn 
the way he did was because of the size of his truck. He stated 
he cannot make a right turn from the right side of the road 
unless he goes up onto the curb. (Id. at R. 68, p. 23, lines 22-
25, p. 24, lines 1-15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly concluded that Officer Scott had a 
reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant committed, was 
committing, or was about to commit a crime prior to stopping him 
1
 On cross examination, Officer Scott testified that the 
distance from Arctic Circle to 250 North is less than one-eighth 
of a mile. (Id. at R. 68, p. 19, lines 8-14). 
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on September 21, 1997. Officer Scott's stop of Defendant was 
based on both the information related to him through the 
dispatcher from Ms. Smith, and also his own observations of 
Defendant. Officer Scott made the stop as soon as was practical 
after arriving at the location, observing the defendant, and 
positioning himself to make a stop of the vehicle. Therefore, 
the stop was based on a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
defendant was engaged in or about to commit a crime, and the 
trial court's ruling should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS BASED ON AN ARTICULABLE, 
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED, WAS IN THE ACT 
OF COMMITTING, OR WAS ABOUT TO COMMIT A CRIME. 
This Court must consider whether or not the trial judge 
erred in concluding that Officer Scott had a reasonable suspicion 
to stop the defendant. The Utah legislature has codified the 
standard for reasonable suspicion in Utah Code Annotated Section 
77-7-15 which provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that a police 
dispatch based on articulable facts supporting a reasonable 
suspicion of an attempt or commission of a public offense may be 
relied upon by police officers in stopping a vehicle and making 
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further investigation. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 
1989). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently addressed the issue 
of informant reliability in determining reasonable suspicion on 
facts similar to those in this case. 
In City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 168(Utah Ct. 
App. 1997), this Court stated: 
[T]he legality of a stop based on information imparted 
by another will depend on the sufficiency of the 
articulable facts known to the [officer] originating 
the information or bulletin subsequently received and 
acted upon by the investigating officer. State v. 
Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
However, the investigating officer need not be actually 
informed of all the underlying facts known to the 
originating officer that establish reasonable 
suspicion. Id. At 1277. 
The Carter Court discussed further what is required to make an 
informant's tip sufficient to justify a detention of a vehicle 
and its driver, citing Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
In Mulcahy, supra, the Court identified three factors to 
determine reliability of an informant's tip. The first factor is 
the type of tip or informant involved. An identified "citizen 
informant" is highly reliable because a citizen informer 
volunteers information out of concern for the community, not for 
personal benefit. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. In addition, the 
citizen informant exposes himself to liability if the report is 
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false, State v. Bybee, 884 P.2d 906, 908 (Or. Ct. App. 1994), and 
by providing a name to make it easy for the police to verify 
information. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36, citing State v. Roth, 
827 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The second factor is whether the informant gave enough 
detail about the activity to support a stop. Roth 827 P.2d at 
258. A tip is more reliable if the informant observed the 
details personally. The more details that an informant can give 
about the defendant and the vehicle, the more reliable the 
information. Mulcahy 943 P.2d at 236. 
The final factor is whether the police officer's 
observations confirm the dispatcher's report of the informant's 
tip. Roth 827 P.2d at 258. Corroboration of the tip can be by 
observing the illegal activity or by finding the person or 
vehicle in the location described by the informant. Mulcahy 943 
P.2d at 236. 
In this case, the informant, Ms. Smith, is an employee of 
Arctic Circle. She called the police because she was concerned 
that the defendant was intoxicated and that he may attempt to 
drive away from the restaurant. She gave her name to the 
dispatcher so the police could verify her information. 
Therefore, the first factor is satisfied. 
As to the second factor, Ms. Smith personally observed the 
facts she related to dispatch, i.e., defendant almost falling 
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when entering the restaurant, defendant smelling of alcohol, and 
his slurred speech. She was also able to give a description of 
both the defendant and his vehicle. 
To corroborate the information given by Ms. Smith, Officer 
Scott went to a location where he could observe Arctic Circle. 
He saw defendant's vehicle in the parking lot and then saw an 
individual matching the description of defendant walk out of the 
restaurant and get into the vehicle. He made contact with 
defendant as soon as was practical under all the circumstances. 
He did not allow defendant to drive for an extended period of 
time before making the stop. Defendant had driven less than one 
eighth of a mile before making a right turn. It was immediately 
after the turn that Officer Scott initiated the stop. Therefore, 
the requirements of the third factor are also met in this case. 
The trial court correctly concluded, just as in Carter and 
Mulcahy, that the stop in this case was based on an articulable, 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the 
influence of alcohol. This is supported not only by Officer 
Scott's observations, but also by the reliable information 
relayed to Officer Scott from dispatch as related by Ms. Smith. 
CONCLUSION 
The stop of defendant's vehicle was valid based on the 
information Officer Scott received from dispatch regarding an 
intoxicated person leaving the Arctic Circle and Officer Scott's 
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own observations of the Defendant. Therefore, the trial court 
was correct in its finding that the stop was valid and ruled 
correctly in denying defendant's motion to suppress. The 
decision of the trial court should be upheld. 
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